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Abstract
The paper is devoted to dynamic games. We consider a general enough framework,
which is not limited to e.g. differential games and could accommodate both discrete
and continuous time. Assuming common dynamics, we study two game families with
total payoffs that are defined either as the Cesa`ro average (long run average game
family) or Abel average (discounting game family) of the running costs. We study a
robust strategy that would provide a near-optimal total payoff for all sufficiently small
discounts and for all sufficiently large planning horizons. Assuming merely the Dynamic
Programming Principle, we prove the following Tauberian theorem: if a strategy is
uniformly optimal for one of the families (when discount goes to zero for discounting
games, when planning horizon goes to infinity in long run average games) and its value
functions converge uniformly, then, for the other family, this strategy is also uniformly
optimal and its value functions converge uniformly to the same limit.
Keywords: Dynamic programming principle, dynamic games, uniform value, Abel
mean, Cesa`ro mean
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In dynamic optimization, most often, the potential infinity of the planning horizon is
emulated by considering the running cost averaged with respect to the uniform or exponential
distributions (Cesa`ro average or Abel average, respectively). In this paper, we consider the
correspondence between the value function of dynamic games with these total payoff families.
The theorems that describe the connection between the Cesa`ro and Abel averages are long
known as Tauberian.
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The existence of a limit of the value function when the running cost is averaged with
respect to the uniform or exponential distributions means that the value functions are robust
with respect to the choice of discount (the planning horizon) as long as it is small (large)
enough. In particular, it is exactly this value (asymptotic approach) that is viewed as the
game’s value for the infinite planning horizon in stochastic statements. Furthermore, in
these statements, often enough (see [1, 15]), one could also find a robust strategy that would
provide a near-optimal total payoff for all sufficiently small discounts and for all sufficiently
large planning horizons [21, 23, 7, 11] (uniform approach).
Within the framework of the asymptotic approach, under mild assumptions, there holds
the following Tauberian theorem: the uniform convergence of the value functions for the
running costs averaged with respect to the uniform and/or exponential distributions guar-
antees, for the other distribution, the uniform convergence of its value functions to the same
limit. Such a result was proved for stochastic games with finite numbers of states and ac-
tions [15] and for discrete-time optimal control problems [12]. It has been relatively recently
transferred to the general control problems [16], differential games [8], and a broad class
of stochastic games [22]. Then, a Tauberian theorem for all two-person zero-sum games
satisfying the Dynamic Programming Principle was proved [10].
Surprisingly, the Tauberian theorem proved in [10] lends itself well to the proof of the
corresponding Tauberian theorem for the uniform approach. This result is the main contri-
bution of this article.
Dynamic system
Assume the following items are given:
• a nonempty set Ω, the data space;
• a nonempty set K of maps from [0,∞) to Ω;
• a running cost g : Ω 7→ [0, 1].
For each process z ∈ K, let the map t 7→ g(z(t)) be be Borel measurable. Now, for all
positive λ, T > 0, consider the payoffs
vT (z)
△
=
1
T
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt ∀z ∈ K;
wλ(z)
△
= λ
∫ ∞
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt ∀z ∈ K.
On game value maps
2
Denote by U the set of all bounded maps from Ω to R; denote by C a non-empty set of
maps from K to R. Hereinafter assume that the set C contains all conceivable payoffs, and
the set U contains all value functions for all games with payoffs c ∈ C.
Let C satisfy the following condition:
Ac+B ∈ C for all A ≥ 0, B ∈ R if c ∈ C. (1a)
Hereinafter we assume that vT , wλ ∈ C for all positive λ, T.
A map V from C to U is called a game value map if the following conditions hold:
V [Ac+B] = AV [c] +B for all c ∈ C, A ≥ 0, B ∈ R, (1b)
V [c1](ω) ≤ V [c2](ω) for all ω ∈ Ω if c1(z) ≤ c2(z) for all z ∈ K. (1c)
On Dynamic Programming Principle
Fix a game value map V . For all positive λ, T, h > 0 and the game value map V , define
payoffs ζh,T : K→ R, ξh,λ : K→ R as follows:
ζh,T (z)
△
=
1
T + h
∫ h
0
g(z(t)) dt+
T
T + h
V [vT ](z(h)) ∀z ∈ K;
ξh,λ(z)
△
= λ
∫ h
0
e−λtg(z(t)) dt+ e−λhV [wλ](z(h)) ∀z ∈ K.
Definition 1 Let us say that the payoffs vT (T > 0) (resp., wλ(λ > 0)) enjoy the weak Dy-
namic Programming Principle with respect to the game value map V if the payoffs ζh,T (T, h ∈
N) (resp., payoffs ξh,λ(λ > 0, h ∈ N)) lie in C and, for every ε > 0, there exists natural N
such that, for all natural h, T > N and positive λ < 1/N ,
∣∣V [vT+h](ω)− V [ζh,T ](ω)∣∣ < ε
(∣∣V [wλ](ω)− V [ξh,λ](ω)∣∣ < ε
)
∀ω ∈ Ω. (2)
In particular, the family of payoffs vT (T > 0) (resp., wλ(λ > 0)) enjoys the weak Dynamic
Programming Principle if
V [vT+h] = V [ζh,T ],
(
V [wλ] = V [ξh,λ]
)
∀h, T ∈ N, λ > 0.
Note that the technical requirements ζh,T ∈ C and ξh,λ ∈ C can always be provided for by
extending V [10, Lemma 1]. The key requirement in the Dynamic Programming Principle
is the uniform approximativity of the value functions V [vT+h] and V [wλ] with V [ζh,T ] and
V [ξh,λ], respectively.
The cornerstone result for this article’s main theorem was proved in [10]:
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Theorem 1 Let there be given a game value map V : C→ U. Let vT , wλ ∈ C for all λ, T > 0.
Assume that payoffs vT (T > 0) and payoffs wλ(λ > 0) enjoy the weak Dynamic Programming
Principle.
Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(ı) The family of functions V [vT ] (T > 0) converges uniformly on Ω as T ↑ ∞.
(ıı) The family of functions V [wλ] (λ > 0) converges uniformly on Ω as λ ↓ 0.
Moreover, when at least one of these statements hold, then, for both families, the correspond-
ing limits of the value functions exist, are uniform in ω ∈ Ω, and coincide.
Note that in this theorem the requirement of the dynamic programming principle could
not be omitted, see [9]. The limits must remain uniform unless additional assumptions are
made, even in control problems and the stochastic statement; see the counterexample in
e.g. [16] and [22], respectively.
On strategies
Assume that a strategy set S is given, and, for each strategy s ∈ S, we construct a game
value map Vs : C→ U. Consider the game value map
Vbest[c](ω) = sup
s∈S
Vs[c](ω) ∀c ∈ C, ω ∈ Ω. (3)
Definition 2 Let us say that a strategy s ∈ S is called uniformly optimal for the payoff
family vT (T > 0) (resp., wλ(λ > 0)) iff
lim
T↑∞
sup
ω∈Ω
∣∣Vbest[vT ]− Vs[vT ]∣∣ = 0
(
lim
λ↓0
sup
ω∈Ω
∣∣Vbest[wλ]− Vs[wλ]∣∣ = 0
)
.
An unexpected pleasure is the fact that the assumptions of the following theorem allow the
use of any strategy, a strategy of whatever kind: if only it satisfies the Dynamic Programming
Principle, we get a uniformly optimal strategy for both payoff families.
Theorem 2 Let there be given game value maps Vs : C → U for each strategy s ∈ S, and
let the game value map Vbest be defined by the rule (3). Let there be given a strategy s∗ ∈ S.
Assume that the payoffs vT (T > 0) and payoffs wλ(λ > 0) enjoy the weak Dynamic
Programming Principle with respect to Vs∗ and Vbest. Then, the following conditions are
equivalent:
(v) the strategy s∗ is uniformly optimal for the payoff family vT (T > 0), in addition, the
functions Vbest[vT ] converge uniformly in Ω as T ↑ ∞;
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(w) the strategy s∗ is uniformly optimal for the payoff family wλ(λ > 0), in addition, the
functions Vbest[wλ] converge uniformly in Ω as λ ↓ 0;
(eq) all limits in
lim
T↑∞
Vbest[vT ](ω), lim
λ↓0
Vbest[wλ](ω), lim
T↑∞
Vs∗ [vT ](ω), lim
λ↓0
Vs∗ [wλ](ω) (4)
exist, are uniform in ω ∈ Ω, and coincide.
Proof.
Note that (eq) ⇒ (v) and (eq) ⇒ (w) hold by the definition. So, it would suffice to
prove (v) ⇒ (eq), (w) ⇒ (eq). We will prove (v) ⇒ (eq); the proof of the last implication
(w)⇒ (eq) is similar.
Let the strategy s∗ be uniformly optimal for the payoff family vT (T > 0), and let the
functions Vbest[vT ] converge uniformly in Ω as T ↑ ∞ to a function U∗ ∈ U. Then, by
the definition of the uniformly optimal strategy, the functions Vs∗[vT ] also converge to U∗
uniformly in Ω as T ↑ ∞. Applying Theorem 1 for the game value map Vs∗ , we see that
Vs∗ [wλ] converge to U∗ uniformly in Ω as λ ↓ 0. Applying this theorem for the game value
map Vbest, we have that Vbest[wλ] converge to U∗ uniformly in Ω as λ ↓ 0. Then, in view of
the definition of the uniformly optimal strategy, we see that s∗ is uniformly optimal for the
payoff family wλ(λ > 0). 
Question 1. Is the uniform optimality of a strategy for the payoffs vT (T > 0) and for
the payoffs wλ(λ > 0) still equivalent without the additional requirement on the uniform
convergence of arbitrary value functions?
Question 2. Could the assumption on Dynamic Programming Principle be relaxed?
Question 3. Can there be a topology for U that is different from the uniform topology?
A partial answer to Question 2 will be considered for the following important case.
The case of one player
For all τ ∈ [0,∞), z′, z′′ ∈ K with the property z′(τ) = z′′(0) and them only, let us define
their concatenation—likewise, a mapping from [0,∞) to Ω—as follows:
(z′ ⋄τ z
′′)(t)
△
=
{
z′(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ;
z′′(t− τ), t > τ.
∀t ≥ 0.
Following [16], assume that
Γ(ω)
△
= {z ∈ K | z(0) = ω} 6= ∅ ∀ω ∈ Ω;
also, assume that the set K is closed with respect to concatenation.
Let S be the set of all selectors Ω ∈ ω 7→ s[ω] ∈ K of the set-valued map ω 7→ Γ(ω), i.e.,
the set of all mappings Ω ∈ ω 7→ s[ω] ∈ K such that s[ω](0) = ω for all ω ∈ Ω.
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Definition 3 Let us say that a strategy s∗ ∈ S is stationary-like (does not change when
shifted in time) if
s∗[ω](t+ 1) = s∗
[
s∗[ω](1)
]
(t) ∀ω ∈ Ω, t ≥ 0.
Let C and U be the sets of all scalar bounded maps from K and Ω, respectively. For all
s ∈ S, define Vs : C→ U by the following rule:
Vs[c](ω)
△
= c(s[ω]) ∀ω ∈ Ω, c ∈ C.
Let us also define Vbest : C→ U by (3). Then,
Vbest[c](ω) = sup
z∈K,z(0)=ω
c(z) ∀ω ∈ Ω, c ∈ C.
It is easy to see that Vbest and Vs, for all s ∈ S, are game value maps.
Theorem 3 Assume that the set K is closed with respect to concatenation and that Γ(ω) is
non-empty for all ω ∈ Ω. Let a strategy s∗ ∈ S be stationary-like.
Then, conditions (v), (w), (eq) are equivalent.
Proof.
It is easy to see that, since the strategy s∗ ∈ S is stationary-like, the payoffs vT (T > 0)
and payoffs wλ(λ > 0) enjoy the weak Dynamic Programming Principle with respect to Vs∗ .
Since the set K is closed with respect to concatenation, we have
Vbest[c](ω) = sup
s∈S
c(s[ω]) ≥ sup
s0,s1∈S
c(s0[ω] ⋄1 s1[s0[ω](1)]),
Vbest[c](ω) = sup
s∈S
c(s[ω]) ≥ sup
s0,s1∈S
c(s0[ω] ⋄n s1[s0[ω](n)]), ∀n ∈ N.
Then, for all positive λ and natural n, T , for all ω ∈ Ω, we have
Vbest[wλ](ω) ≥ sup
s∈S
[
λ
∫ n
0
e−λtg(s[ω](t)) dt+ e−λnVbest[wλ](s[ω](n))
]
,
Vbest[vT+n](ω) ≥ sup
s∈S
[ 1
T + n
∫ n
0
g(s[ω](t)) dt+
T
T + n
Vbest[vT ](s[ω](n))
]
.
Thus, with respect to the game value map Vbest, Vbest[wλ] is a subsolution (see [10, Defini-
tion 1]) for the payoffs wλ(λ > 0), and Vbest[vT ] is a subsolution for the payoffs vT (T > 0).
So, it would again suffice to prove (v)⇒ (eq), (w)⇒ (eq).
Let the strategy s∗ be uniformly optimal for the payoff family vT (T > 0) (resp., wλ(λ >
0)), and let its value functions Vbest[vT ] converge uniformly in Ω to a function U∗ ∈ U. Then,
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by the definition of the uniformly optimal strategy, the value functions Vs∗[vT ] (resp., Vs∗ [wλ])
also converge uniformly in Ω to U∗ ∈ U. Since the payoffs vT (T > 0) and payoffs wλ(λ > 0)
enjoy the Dynamic Programming Principle with respect to Vs∗ , applying Theorem 1 for the
game value map Vs∗ , we see that Vs∗ [wλ] and Vs∗[vT ] also converge to U∗ uniformly in Ω. So,
the lower limit of Vbest[vT ]− U∗ (resp., of Vbest[wλ]− U∗) is nonnegative.
On the other hand, applying [10, Proposition 3] to the subsolution Vbest[wλ] (applying
[10, Proposition 4] to the subsolution Vbest[vT ]) and for the game value map Vbest we find
that, for every positive ε, there exists a natural N such that Vbest[wλ](ω) ≤ Vbest[vT ](ω) + ε(
Vbest[vT ](ω) ≤ Vbest[wλ](ω) + ε
)
for all positive T > N , λ = 1/N , and for all ω ∈ Ω. So,
the upper limit of U∗ − Vbest[vT ] (resp., of U∗ − Vbest[wλ]) is also nonnegative.
Thus, Vbest[wλ] and Vbest[vT ] converge to U∗ uniformly in Ω. Since, see above, Vs∗ [wλ]
and Vs∗ [vT ] also converge to U∗ uniformly in Ω, by the definition, s∗ is a uniformly optimal
strategy for both the payoffs vT (T > 0) and wλ(λ > 0). 
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